There was a time when it was commonly accepted by “civilized” people that those of non-European descent deserved to be chattel. There was a time when women could be viewed as property. In general, it seems that humanity has over time increased its level of moral sophistication and expanded its moral universe. In particular, there has been a focus on rights-based analysis: People have intrinsic rights, inalienable, and it is always wrong to eclipse them. In the modern era, there are many, such as Regan, who submit that perhaps the next logical evolution in our expanding moral universe is animal rights, treating animals with certain inalienable levels of treatment Regan makes clear that animal rights generally mean just that: Rights that animals have to certain levels of treatment. Like all rights analyses, these arguments are deontological rather than utiltitarian or consequentialist. Even if you can get a “good” outcome for killing a cow or experimenting on a rabbit, it is wrong because it violates some norm that, if the violation were universalized, would cease to exist. Society as a whole might benefit from animal testing, but it is still torture. A key assumption to this argument is some kind of parallelism between animal and humanity. Virtually no one sheds a tear for the destruction of a rock. If a rock needs to be destroyed for society’s good, there is no hand-wringing. Consequentalist analysis is assumed when we are speaking of the purely material world. Thus, animal rights debates center not just on the classic deontological-consequentialist debate, but also on the issues: What is life? If we view life as divine, is that divinity only confined to man? What matters in our moral universe? Is it sentience? If so, how much sentience? Is it the ability to feel pain? If so, to what degree of sensitivity? There are some who argue that animal rights are absolute, that just as a human’s free speech can never be violate so can an animal’s rights against pain or death never be undermined. Regan contrasts these people with those who view animal rights as something more contingent and fluid (70). The two groups have clear differences. The latter group could justify animal experimentation, or slaughter for meat or leather, if there was an immensely compelling social reason. Notice that the latter group would still reject, say, cosmetics testing on animals. Cosmetics testing does not meet the threshold of social value that they prescribe. There are some who are of neither opinion, who hold that animals are essentially dispensable. For them, humane slaughter is absurd unless it’s also more efficient. Ted Nugent might be considered a member of this movement that views humans and animals as in two totally separate moral universes.